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Richard K. Prue , 
Senior Senior 
Consultant with the 
Stevenson Group, 
Washington, D.C., 
explains that “The 
Compact na ons 
receive U.S. bilateral 
economic assistance on 
a per capita basis 
higher than any other 
country, including 
Israel.” 
A Compact of Free Associa on (COFA) with the Republic of Kiriba  would strengthen the U.S. strategic 
posture in the Pacific, win the moral high ground in the global climate change debate, and strengthen its 
diploma c foo ng in Pacific regional architecture, while giving Kiriba  strong defense guarantees, 
generous immigra on terms, and modest development assistance. 
Kiriba  is a Pacific Micronesian country, as are Nauru and the Freely Associated States (FAS), consis ng of 
Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. The three FAS countries were administered during the post‐
war period by the United States in trusteeship for the United Na ons (UN), but none was ever a U.S. 
colony. Each is now a sovereign country and full UN member. The U.S. compacts with the FAS are 
interna onal trea es with force in U.S. law equal to the Cons tu on.  
Under the legal terms of the Compacts, the FAS countries are America's closest allies, because the 
Compacts mandate the United States by law to defend these countries and their ci zens as it would U.S. 
territory and its own ci zens. They require the United States to provide consular services to FAS ci zens 
abroad in the many countries where they have no diploma c mission of their own. Remarkably, the 
Compacts allow FAS ci zens to visit, work, and establish residency in the United States without visas. They 
even bring these countries inside the U.S. postal system, assigning them separate zip codes and charging 
only domes c mail rates. The U.S. Coast Guard patrols their Exclusive Economic Zones, which range into 
millions of nau cal miles. FAS ci zens may enlist in the U.S. military, and, in fact, do enlist at rates much 
higher than the U.S. na onal average. And the Compact na ons receive U.S. bilateral economic assistance 
on a per capita basis higher than any other country, including Israel. 
In return, the FAS countries yield to the United States the management of their external defense. As a 
prac cal ma er, FAS governments retain control of their foreign policies but must regularly consult with 
Washington to ensure those policies do not undercut or conflict with the U.S. defense role. In a similar 
vein, U.S. defense of FAS countries includes the concomitant and explicit right to deny the transit of 
warships or basing of forces from other countries. Nonetheless, the FAS countries con nue to pursue 
independent foreign policies — as evidenced by the diploma c rela ons the Marshall Islands and Palau 
maintain with Taipei, while Micronesia not only recognizes Beijing but is hailed as its model for bilateral 
rela ons with Pacific Island countries. 
Although many in Palau and Ulithi Atoll in Yap, Micronesia, con nually express their desire for U.S. bases, 
the only U.S. military facility in the FAS is the Ronald Reagan Ballis c Missile Defense Test Site. Located at 
Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands, this $4 billion facility is important to U.S. na onal security for tracking 
ballis c missile tests and other reasons.  
Rumors that Beijing and/or Moscow seek naval bases in the Pacific have not been borne out to date. From 
1997 to 2003, the PRC maintained a satellite tracking sta on in Kiriba . As China's only offshore satellite 
facility, the sta on was important to Beijing's space program and perhaps for monitoring Kwajalein and 
U.S. missile tests. Beijing lost the sta on when Kiriba  switched diploma c recogni on from Beijing to 
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Taipei in 2003. Kiriba ’s new president recently reversed this policy, reportedly in considera on for 
funding for airplanes and commercial ferries.  
A COFA like those between the United States and the FAS would allow the United States to exercise 
direct military control over Kiriba 's large Exclusive Economic Zones, one of which is con guous with 
the U.S. EEZ around Hawaii, thereby adding to America's defense in depth by denying military access 
to Kiriba  by another power, bolstering U.S.‐Kiriba  law enforcement, helping to combat 
transna onal crime, and crea ng new op ons for the exercise of U.S. military power. 
A U.S.‐Kiriba  COFA would broaden and strengthen the U.S.‐affiliated Pacific Island countries (USAPI), 
giving this bloc greater clout in intergovernmental organiza ons and Pacific regional architecture. A 
COFA would allow the United States to expand and further consolidate the FAS as a poli cal 
construct, helping to counteract the secessionist pressures that threaten the linchpin of the FAS, 
Micronesia, with na onal dissolu on. It would serve as a vehicle for reintegra ng the 100,000 I‐
Kiriba  with their Micronesian neighbors. A COFA with Kiriba  might even spur Nauru and/or even 
the Philippines to consider free associa on. During its Commonwealth years (1935‐46), the 
Philippines was America’s first Associated State. Free associa on would propel the Philippines to the 
leadership of this diploma c bloc. 
The true value of the deal to Kiriba  would be in the immigra on status that free associa on might 
bring. I‐Kiriba  who found condi ons no longer tolerable in Kiriba  might be able to relocate to the 
United States. These would not be large numbers in absolute terms; likely most I‐Kiriba  would 
choose not to emigrate. A small increase in Federal Compact Impact assistance funding to Guam and 
Hawaii would need to offset any nega ve immigra on impacts. But the impact could also be posi ve. 
The FAS and America’s Pacific territories are easily the most produc ve recrui ng grounds for the U.S. 
military, and improved educa onal standards in the islands could make them doubly so. Because the 
immigra on terms of the Compacts are reciprocal, Americans could be free to travel, live, and work in 
Kiriba  without visas. 
The cost to the United States likely would be modest in terms of development assistance – perhaps 
$10 million a year in bilateral assistance and an addi onal $3 million in federal Compact Impact 
funding. The economic aid could help Kiriba  upgrade Bonriki Interna onal Airport in Tarawa, 
perhaps allowing the U.S. Peace Corps to return and enabling more air travel among Micronesian 
na ons.  
The value of the deal to Washington would be deeper influence over Kiriba ’s EEZ and within regional 
and interna onal organiza ons – not just on issues related to climate change but on the full range of 
issues touching on the na onal interests of the USAPI.  
The U.S. variant of free associa on formally underscores the sovereignty of its par es, even as it 
deliberately integrates aspects of their rela onship for the purpose of defending that sovereignty. 
That integra on can grow over me, if the par es prefer, or remain as limited as they wish. Even a 
republican form of government, as guaranteed by the U.S. Cons tu on to each U.S. state, is not a 
prerequisite for free associa on. It is, however, an organizing principle already adopted by the 
government and people of Kiriba  — a shared principle the United States, the FAS, and Kiriba  can 
best defend collec vely, in strong alliance and free associa on. 
"A U.S.‐Kiriba  COFA 
would broaden and 
strengthen the U.S.‐
affiliated Pacific Island 
countries (USAPI), 
giving this bloc greater 
clout in 
intergovernmental 
organiza ons and 
Pacific regional 
architecture." 
A  former U.S. Foreign Service officer, Richard K. Prue  is now a senior consultant with The Stevenson 
Group, a Washington‐based consultancy specializing in interna onal development and security.  He can 
be reached with comments at: rprue @stevenson.global.  
